Do Analyst Conflicts Matter? Evidence from Stock Recommendations
In April 2003, ten of the largest Wall Street firms reached a landmark settlement with state and federal securities regulators on the issue of conflicts of interest faced by stock analysts. 1 The settlement requires the firms to pay a record $1.4 billion in compensation and penalties in response to government charges that the firms issued optimistic stock research to win favor with potential investment banking clients. Part of the settlement funds are earmarked for investor education and for provision of research from independent firms. In addition to requiring large monetary payments, the settlement mandates structural changes in the firms' research operations and requires the firms to disclose conflicts of interest in analysts' research reports.
The notion that investors are victims of biased stock research presumes that (1) analysts respond to the conflicts by inflating their stock recommendations, and (2) investors take analysts' recommendations at face value. Even if analysts are biased, it is possible that investors understand the conflicts of interest inherent in stock research and rationally discount analysts' opinions. This alternative viewpoint, if accurate, would lead to very different conclusions about the consequences of analyst research. Indeed, investor rationality and self-interested behavior imply that stock prices should accurately reflect a consensus about the informational quality of public announcements (see Grossman (1976) and Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) ). Rational investors would recognize and adjust for analysts' potential conflicts of interest, largely avoiding the adverse consequences of biased stock recommendations.
In this paper, we provide evidence on the extent to which analysts and investors respond to conflicts of interest in stock research. We address four questions. First, is the extent of optimism in stock recommendations related to the magnitudes of analysts'
conflicts of interest? Second, to what extent do investors discount the opinions of more conflicted analysts? In particular, do stock prices and trading volumes react to recommendation revisions in a manner that rationally reflects the degree of analyst conflicts? Third, is the medium-term (i.e., three-to twelve-month) performance of recommendation revisions related to conflict severity? And finally, do conflicts of interest affect analysts or investors differently during the late 1990s stock bubble than during the post-bubble period? The answers to these questions are clearly of relevance to stock market participants, public policy makers, regulators, and the academic profession.
We use a unique, hand-collected dataset that contains the annual revenue breakdown for 232 public and private analyst employers. This information allows us to construct quantitative measures of the magnitude of potential conflicts not only from investment banking, but also from brokerage business. We analyze a sample of over 110,000 stock recommendations issued by over 4,000 analysts during the 1994-2003 time period. Using univariate tests as well as cross-sectional regressions that control for size of the followed company and individual analysts' experience, resources, workloads, and reputations, we attempt to shed light both on how analysts respond to pressures from investment banking and brokerage and on how investors compensate for the existence of such conflicts of interest.
A number of studies (e.g., Dugar and Nathan (1995) , Lin and McNichols (1998) , Michaely and Womack (1999) , Dechow, Hutton, and Sloan (2000) , and Bradley, Jordan, and Ritter (2007)) have focused on conflicts faced by analysts in the context of existing underwriting relationships. 2 Our paper complements this literature in several ways. First, we take into account the pressure to generate underwriting business from both current and potential client companies. Even if an analyst's firm does not currently do investment banking (IB) business with a company that the analyst tracks, it might like to do so in the future. Second, we examine the conflict between research and all investment banking services (including advice on mergers, restructuring, and corporate control), rather than just underwriting. Third, we examine conflicts arising from brokerage business in addition to those from IB.
3 Fourth, the prior empirical finding that underwriter analysts tend to be more optimistic than other analysts is consistent with two alternative interpretations: (a) an optimistic report on a company by an underwriter analyst is a reward for past IB business or an attempt to win future IB business by currying favor with the company; or (b) a company chooses an underwriter whose analyst likes the stock to begin with. The second interpretation implies that underwriter choice is endogenous, and does not necessarily imply a conflict of interest. We sidestep this issue of endogeneity by not focusing on underwriting relations between an analyst's firm and the followed company. Instead, our conflict measures focus on the importance to the analyst's firm of investment banking and brokerage businesses, as measured by the percentage of its annual revenue derived from IB business and from brokerage commissions. Unlike underwriting relations between an analyst's firm and the followed company, the proportions of the entire firm's revenues from each of these businesses can reasonably be viewed as given, exogenous variables from the viewpoint of an individual analyst. Finally, our approach yields substantially larger sample sizes than those used in prior research, leading to greater statistical reliability of the results.
Several papers adopt an approach that is similar in spirit to ours. For example, Barber, Lehavy and Trueman (2007) find that recommendation upgrades (downgrades)
by investment banks (which typically also have brokerage business) under-perform (outperform) similar recommendations by non-IB brokerages and independent research firms. Cowen, Groysberg and Healy (2006) find that full service securities firms (which have both IB and brokerage businesses) issue less optimistic forecasts and recommendations than non-IB brokerage houses. Finally, Jacob, Rock and Weber (2007) find that short-term earnings forecasts made by investment banks are more accurate and less optimistic than those made by independent research firms. We extend this line of research by quantifying the reliance of a securities firm on IB and brokerage businesses.
This is an important feature of our paper for at least two reasons. First, given that many securities firms operate in multiple lines of business, it is difficult to classify them by employed by larger brokerages issue more optimistic recommendations and more accurate earnings forecasts. However, none of these papers examine how investor responses to analyst recommendations and the investment performance of recommendations vary with the severity of brokerage conflicts, issues that we investigate here.
business lines. By separately measuring the magnitudes of both IB and brokerage conflicts in each firm, our approach avoids the need to rely on a classification scheme.
Second, since the focus of this research is on the consequences of analysts' conflicts, the measurement of those conflicts is important. Our conclusions sometimes differ from classification-based studies.
We find that analysts do indeed seem to respond to pressures from investment banking and brokerage: larger potential conflicts of interest from these businesses are associated with more positive stock recommendations. We also document that the distortive effects of investment banking were larger during the late-1990s stock bubble than during the post-bubble period. Nonetheless, the empirical analysis yields several pieces of evidence to suggest that investors are sophisticated enough to adjust for these biases. First, the short-term reactions of both stock prices and trading volumes to recommendation upgrades are significantly negatively related to the magnitudes of potential IB or brokerage conflicts. For downgrades, the corresponding relation is negative for stock prices but positive for trading volume. Second, the one-year investment performance of recommendation revisions bears no systematic relationship with the magnitude of conflicts. Finally, investors continued to discount conflicted analysts' opinions during the bubble period, even amidst the euphoria prevailing in the market at the time. Altogether, these results strongly support the idea that the marginal investor rationally discounts stock recommendations taking analysts' conflicts into account.
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We discuss the issues in section 2 and describe our sample and data in section 3. Section 4 examines the relation between recommendation levels and the degree of IB or brokerage conflict faced by analysts. Section 5 analyzes how conflicts are related to the response of stock prices and trading volume to recommendation revisions. Section 6 investigates the relation between conflicts and the investment performance of recommendation revisions. Section 7 4 In a companion paper (Agrawal and Chen (2005)), we find that analysts appear to respond to conflicts when making long-term earnings growth projections, but not short-term earnings forecasts. This finding is consistent with the idea that with short-term forecasts, analysts worry about their deception being revealed with the next quarterly earnings release, but they have greater leeway with long-term forecasts. We also find that the frequency of forecast revisions is positively related to the magnitude of brokerage conflicts, and several tests suggest that analysts' trade generation incentives impair the quality of stock research.
presents our results for the late 1990s stock bubble and post-bubble periods, and section 8 concludes.
Issues and hypotheses
Investment banking activity is a potential source of analyst conflict that has received widespread attention in the financial media (e.g., Gasparino (2002) and Maremont and Bray (2004) ) as well as the academic literature (e.g., Lin and McNichols (1998) and Michaely and Womack (1999) ). When IB business is an important source of revenue for a securities firm, a stock analyst employed by the firm often faces pressure to inflate his recommendations. This pressure is due to the fact that the firm would like to sell IB services to a company that the analyst tracks. 5, 6 The company, in turn, would like the analyst to support its stock with a favorable opinion. Thus, we expect that the more critical is investment banking revenue to an analyst's employer, the greater the incentives an analyst faces to issue optimistic recommendations.
An analyst also faces a potential conflict with his employer's brokerage business.
Here, the pressure on the analyst originates not from the companies that he follows, but from within his firm. Brokerage trading generates a large portion of most securities firms' revenues, and analyst compensation schemes are typically related explicitly or implicitly to trading commissions. Thus, analysts have incentives to increase trading volume in both directions (i.e., buys and sells). Given the many institutional constraints that make short sales relatively costly, a much larger set of investors participates in stock purchases as compared to stock sales. 7 Indeed, it is mostly existing shareholders of a stock who sell.
This asymmetry between purchases and sales implies that the more important is 5 Throughout the paper, we refer to an analyst's employer as a 'firm' and a company followed by an analyst as a 'company'. 6 Ljungqvist, Marston and Wilhelm (2005, 2006) find that while optimistic recommendations do not help the analyst's firm win the lead underwriter or co-manager positions in general, they help the firm win the co-manager position in deals where the lead underwriter is a commercial bank.
7 Numerous regulations in the United States increase the cost of selling shares short (see, e.g., Dechow, Hutton, Meulbroek and Sloan (2001) The relation between conflict severity and the short-term (two-or three-day) stock-price impact of a recommendation should depend upon whether investors react to the opinion rationally or naïvely. 9 Under the rational discounting hypothesis, the relation should be asymmetric for upgrades and downgrades. For upgrades, the stock price response should be negatively related to the degree of conflict. This is because analysts who face greater pressure from IB or brokerage are likely to be more bullish in their recommendations, and rational investors should discount an analyst's optimism more heavily. For downgrades, however, the story is different. When an analyst downgrades a stock despite facing large conflicts, rational investors should find the negative opinion more convincing and should be more likely to revalue the stock accordingly. This implies that the short-term stock price response to a downgrade should be negatively related to the degree of conflict.
The rational discounting hypothesis also predicts cross-sectional relationships between conflict severity and the short-term trading volume response to recommendations. As Kim and Verrecchia (1991) demonstrate in a rational expectations model of trading, the more precise a piece of news, the more individuals will revise their prior beliefs and hence the more trading that will result. In the present context, investor rationality implies that an upgrade by a highly conflicted analyst represents less precise news to investors, and so such a revision should be followed by relatively small abnormal volume. But when an analyst downgrades a stock despite a substantial conflict, the signal is regarded as being more precise, and thus the downgrade should lead to relatively large abnormal trading. All broker-dealer firms are required to publicly disclose their balance sheets as part of their x-17a-5 filings. But a private broker-dealer firm can withhold the public disclosure of its income statement, which contains the revenue breakdown information needed for this study, if the SEC deems that such disclosure would harm the firm's competitive position.
Thus, our sample of private securities firms is limited to broker-dealers that disclose their revenue breakdown in x-17a-5 filings. We examine whether this selection bias affects our main results by separately analyzing the sub-sample of publicly traded securities firms, for which public disclosure of annual revenue information is mandatory. Our findings do not appear to be affected by this selection bias. All our results for the sub-sample of publicly traded securities firms are qualitatively similar to the results for the full sample reported in the paper. In the Appendix, we describe the characteristics of disclosing and non-disclosing private securities firms, shed some light on the firms' income statement disclosure decisions, and use a selectivity-corrected probit model to examine whether the resulting selection bias can explain analysts' response to conflicts in these private firms. We find no evidence that selection bias affects our results for these firms.
Characteristics of analysts, their employers, and companies followed
We next measure characteristics of analysts, their employers, and the companies they cover. Prior research (e.g., Clement (1999) , and Jacob, Lys, and Neale (1999)) finds that analysts' experience and workloads affect the accuracy and credibility of their research.
Using the I/B/E/S detail history files, we measure an analyst's experience and workloads in terms of all of her research activity reported on I/B/E/S, including stock recommendations, quarterly and annual earnings-per-share (EPS) forecasts, and longterm earnings growth (LTG) forecasts. We measure general research experience as the number of days since an analyst first issued research on any company in the I/B/E/S database, and company-specific research experience as the number of days since an analyst first issued research on a particular company. We measure analyst workload as the number of different companies or the number of different 4-digit I/B/E/S S/I/G industry groups 14 for which an analyst issued research in a given calendar year.
The amount of resources devoted to investment research within brokerage houses also affects the quality of analysts ' research (Clement (1999) Table 1 Over the time span of a year, a company is tracked by a mean (median) of 9.1 (7) analysts.
Conflicts and the levels of analyst recommendations net of the consensus
In this section, we examine whether the level of an analyst's stock recommendation net of the consensus (i.e., median) recommendation level is related to the conflicts that she faces. We start by ascertaining the level of the outstanding recommendation on each stock by each analyst following it at the end of each quarter (March, June, September, December) from 1995 through 2003. An analyst's recommendation on a stock is included only if it is newly issued, reiterated, or revised in the past 12 months.
We estimate a regression explaining individual analysts' net stock recommendation levels at the end of a quarter (= recommendation level minus the median recommendation level across all analysts following a stock during the quarter). 17 The regression pools observations across analysts, stocks and quarters, and includes our two main explanatory variables: the percentages of an analyst employer's total revenues from investment banking and from brokerage commissions. Following Jegadeesh, et al. (2004) 17 To ensure meaningful variation in the dependent variable, we omit stocks followed by only one analyst in a quarter.
and Kadan, et al. (2006) , who find that momentum is an important determinant of analyst recommendations, we control for the prior 6-month stock return.
The regression also controls for other factors that can affect the degree of analyst optimism such as the size of the followed company, and the resources, reputation, experience and workload of an analyst. As a measure of resources available to an analyst, we use a dummy variable for a large brokerage house that equals one if the firm ranks in the top quartile of all houses in terms of the number of analysts employed during the year. We measure analyst reputation by dummy variables that equal one if the recommending analyst was named in the most recent year as an All-American by the Institutional Investor magazine or as an All-Star by the Wall Street Journal. An analyst's company-specific research experience is measured by the natural logarithm of one plus the number of days an analyst has been producing research (i.e., EPS forecasts, long-term growth forecasts, or stock recommendations) on the company. We measure an analyst's workload by the natural logarithm of one plus the number of companies for which she produces forecasts or recommendations in the current year. Size of the followed company is measured by the natural logarithm of its market capitalization, measured 12 months before the end of the month.
Finally, we control for industry and time period effects by adding dummy variables for I/B/E/S 2-digit S/I/G industries and for each calendar quarter (March 1995 , June 1995 . Since net recommendation levels can take ordered values from -4 (strongly pessimistic) to +4 (strongly optimistic) in increments of 0.5, we estimate the regression as an ordered probit model. 18 Z-statistics are based on a robust (Huber/ White/ sandwich) variance estimator. Table 2 shows the regression estimate. In Panel A, the coefficients of the IB revenue % and commission revenue % are both positive, implying that greater conflicts with investment banking and brokerage lead an analyst to issue a higher recommendation on a stock relative to the consensus. Stocks followed by busier analysts and stocks of larger companies receive higher recommendations relative to the consensus. Stocks that experience a price run-up over the prior six months, stocks followed by analysts at large 18 Notice that recommendation levels can take integer values from 1 to 5 and the median recommendation can take values from 1 to 5 in increments of 0.5. See Greene (2003) for a detailed exposition of the ordered probit model. brokerage houses, and stocks followed by Wall Street Journal All-Star analysts all receive lower recommendations relative to the consensus. All of these relations are highly statistically significant.
To provide a sense for the magnitude of the main effects of interest, Panel B
shows derivatives of the probability of each net recommendation level with respect to IB revenue % and commission revenue %. 19 For example, a one standard deviation increase in IB revenue % increases the probability of an optimistic recommendation (i.e., net recommendation level > 0) by .1193 x (.0325 + .0671 + … + .0003) = .0151. Compared to the unconditional probability of an optimistic recommendation by an analyst, this represents an increase of about 5.9% (= .0151 / .2575). The effect of a change in commission revenue % is much smaller. A one standard deviation increase in commission revenue % increases the probability of an optimistic recommendation by
.2475 x .01105 = .0027, or about 1% (=.0027 / .2575) of the unconditional probability.
Thus, despite possible concerns about loss of reputation, analysts seem to respond to conflicts of interest, particularly those stemming from investment banking.
Conflicts and investor response to recommendation revisions

Stock price response
This section examines whether an analyst's credibility with investors is related to the degree of conflict that he faces. We interpret the reaction of stock prices to a recommendation revision as an indication of analyst credibility. Our analysis focuses on revisions in recommendation levels, rather than on recommendation levels per se, because revisions are discrete events that are likely to be salient for investors, and previous research finds that revisions have significant information content (see, e.g., Womack (1996) and Jegadeesh, et al. (2004) 
Average stock price response
We compute the abnormal return on an upgraded or downgraded stock over day t as the return (including dividends) on the stock minus the return on the CRSP equalweighted market portfolio of NYSE, AMEX and Nasdaq stocks. The cumulative abnormal return (CAR) on the stock over days t 1 to t 2 relative to the revision date (day 0) is measured as the sum of the abnormal returns over those days. Table 3 shows mean and median CARs for three windows: days -1 to 0, -1 to +1, and -5 to +5. T-statistics for the difference of the mean abnormal returns from zero are computed as in Brown and Warner (1985) and shown in parentheses below the means. P-values for the Wilcoxon test are reported in parentheses below the medians.
It is clear from the table that recommendation revisions have large effects on stock prices. For example, when a stock is added to the strong buy list, it experiences a mean abnormal return of about 2% over the two-day revision period. Downgrades have even larger effects on stock prices than do upgrades. Strikingly, the two-day mean 20 Our analysis focuses on these four types of revisions instead of the other four (added to strong sell, etc.) because, as shown in Table 1 , Panel A, sell and strong sell recommendations are quite rare. But note that dropped from buy and dropped from buy or strong buy revisions can entail movement to sell or strong sell categories. 21 We use the I/B/E/S Stopped Recommendations file to determine instances where a brokerage firm discontinued coverage of a company. This file contains numerous cases where an analyst 'stops' coverage of a stock, only to issue a new recommendation a month or two later. Conversations with I/B/E/S representatives indicate that such events likely represent pauses in coverage due to company quiet periods or analyst reassignments within a brokerage house. We define a stopped coverage event to be a true stoppage only if the analyst does not issue a recommendation on the stock over the subsequent six months. 22 Note that the definition of our four recommendation revision groups implies that stocks can be added to a group more than once on a given day. Nonetheless, excluding days on which a stock experiences multiple revisions does not change any of our qualitative results.
abnormal return around the dropped from strong buy list is -4%. Median values are consistently smaller in magnitude than means, indicating that some revisions lead to very negative price reactions. Mean and median two-day abnormal returns are statistically different from zero for all four groups of forecast revisions. The magnitudes of abnormal returns are slightly larger over the three-day and eleven-day windows than over the twoday window. Overall, these returns are consistent with those found by prior research that examines the average stock price impact of recommendation revisions (e.g., Womack
(1996) and Jegadeesh, et al. (2004)). Table 4 contains cross-sectional regressions of stock price reactions to recommendation revisions over days -1 to +1. The main explanatory variables of interest in these regressions are our revenue-based measures of the magnitudes of IB and brokerage conflicts. We include controls for the size of an analyst's employer, size of the company followed, and measures of an analyst's reputation, experience and workload. 23 We estimate a separate regression for each of the four groups of recommendation revisions. T-statistics based on a robust variance estimator are reported in parentheses below the coefficient estimates.
Cross-sectional analysis
The coefficient on IB revenue % is significantly negative for both upgrades and downgrades. The coefficient on brokerage commission revenue % is also negative in all four regressions; it is statistically significant in all cases, except in the case of dropped from strong buy revisions. 24 Collectively, these results favor the rational discounting hypothesis over the naïve investor hypothesis. The magnitudes of these effects are nontrivial. For instance, a one standard deviation increase in IB revenue % leads to a change of about -0.31 (-0.42) percentage points in the three-day abnormal return around the move to (from) a strong buy recommendation. Similarly, a one standard deviation increase in brokerage commission revenue % leads to a change of about -0.37 (-0.22) percentage points in the corresponding abnormal return around the move to (from) a buy or strong buy recommendation.
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The results for control variables are also noteworthy. The dummy variable for a large analyst employer is positively (negatively) related to the market reaction to upgrades (downgrades). This finding is consistent with the idea that revisions by analysts employed at larger brokerage houses (which tend to be more reputable) have more credibility with investors. The size of the company followed is negatively (positively) related to the market reaction to upgrades (downgrades), consistent with the notion that for larger companies, an analyst's recommendation competes with more alternative sources of information and advice.
Revisions by Institutional Investor All-American analysts are positively (negatively) related to the stock price reaction to upgrades (downgrades), suggesting that All-American analysts wield more influence with investors. This is a notable finding; we are unaware of previous work documenting a relationship between analyst reputation and the stock price reaction to both upgrades and downgrades. As the coefficient on WSJTEAM indicates, however, being designated as a Wall Street Journal All-Star does not seem to enhance the credibility of an analyst's recommendations. 27 The absence of an effect here is somewhat surprising given that the WSJ has a much broader readership base than Institutional Investor magazine. One explanation is that II analyst rankings are based on an opinion poll of money managers, who control substantial assets and therefore directly affect stock prices, while WSJ rankings are based on strictly quantitative measures of analysts' past stock-picking or forecasting performance.
The market reaction to upgrades is positively related to an analyst's companyspecific research experience. This finding suggests that more experienced analysts tend to be more influential with investors. But the reaction to downgrades is also positively related to analyst experience. Finally, the stock price reaction to upgrades is negatively related to analyst workload, suggesting that busier analysts' opinions tend to get discounted by the market. All of these relations are statistically significant.
Response of trading volume
In this section, we measure analyst credibility via changes in the volume of trade around recommendation revisions. 28 Revisions of analyst recommendations can affect trading volume by inducing investors to rebalance their portfolios to reflect updated beliefs.
Average response of trading volume
We compute the abnormal volume for a trading day t as the mean-adjusted share turnover for stock i: Table 5 shows mean and median values of CAV over three windows surrounding revisions in analyst stock recommendations. Over the two-day revision period, the mean abnormal volume is positive for both upgrades and downgrades, but its magnitude is substantially larger for downgrades. The move to (from) the strong buy list increases a stock's trading volume by a mean of about 0.9% (2.6%) of the outstanding shares, compared to a normal day's volume. For longer windows, mean abnormal volumes are substantially higher for downgrades. Median values are lower than the means. Each mean and median abnormal volume is statistically greater than zero, with a p-value below .01.
Clearly, revisions of stock recommendations by analysts generate trading. Table 6 
Cross-sectional analysis
Conflicts and the performance of recommendation revisions
We next consider the investment performance of analysts' recommendation revisions over periods of up to 12 months. Here, the choice of the benchmark used to compute abnormal returns is somewhat more important than in section 5.1, where we measure abnormal returns over a few days around the revision. But the results here are likely to be less sensitive to the benchmark employed than in studies of long-run stock performance, where the time period of interest can be as long as 5 to 10 years (see, e.g., Agrawal, Jaffe and Mandelker (1992), and Agrawal and Jaffe (2003)).
Average performance
We use an approach similar to Barber, Lehavy and Trueman (2007) . To evaluate the performance of a group of stocks over a given window, say months +1 to +12 following the month of their inclusion (month 0) in a given group of revisions such as the added to strong buy list, we form a portfolio p that initially invests $1 in each recommendation. Each recommended stock remains in the portfolio until month +12 or the month that the stock is either downgraded or dropped from coverage by the securities firm, whichever is earlier. If multiple securities firms recommend a stock in a given month, the stock appears multiple times in the portfolio that month, once for each securities firm with a strong buy recommendation. The portfolio return for calendar month t is given by where R it is the month t return on recommendation i, x it is one plus the compound return on the recommendation from month +1 to month t-1 (i.e., x it equals one for a stock that was recommended in month t), and n t is the number of recommendations in the portfolio.
This yields a time series of monthly returns for portfolio p.
We compute the abnormal performance of portfolio p as the estimate of the intercept term α p from the Fama and French (1993) 3-factor model. Accordingly, we estimate the following time-series regression for portfolio p: (4) R pt -R ft = α p + β 1p (R mt -R ft ) + β 2p SMB t + β 3p HML t + ε pt , t=January 1994 to
where R f is the risk-free rate, R m is the return on the value-weighted market index, SMB equals the monthly return on a portfolio of small firms minus the return on a portfolio of big firms; and HML is the monthly return on a portfolio of high book-to-market ratio firms minus the return on a portfolio of low book-to-market ratio firms. The error term in the regression is denoted by ε. The time series of monthly returns on (R m -R f ), SMB and HML are obtained from Professor Kenneth French's website. 30 We repeat this procedure for each time window of interest, such as months +1 to +3, and for each group of revisions, such as the dropped from strong buy list. Table 7 shows the performance of analysts' recommendation revisions. Over the period of three months following the month of recommendation revision, the average abnormal returns to upgrades are positive and the returns to downgrades are negative.
The magnitudes of these returns are non-trivial. For example, the addition of a stock to the strong buy list has an abnormal monthly return of about 0.8755% or about 2.62% over the three-month period. The pattern is generally similar over longer windows. For example, over months +1 to +12, the abnormal monthly return for the added to strong buy list is 0.679% or about 8.15% over the 12-month period. The abnormal returns are significantly different from zero for upgrades in all cases; they are insignificant for downgrades in all cases except one. Table 8 shows results of a regression similar to that in section 5.1.2 above, except that the dependent variable here is the average monthly abnormal return for a firm over months +1 to +12 following the month of a recommendation revision. We compute this abnormal return by estimating a time-series regression similar to equation (4) above over months +1 to +12 for each stock in a sample of recommendation revisions. The intercept from this regression is our estimate of the performance of the recommendation revision.
Cross-sectional analysis
Observations involving recommendation revisions on a stock that occur within 12 months of an earlier revision are omitted from each regression.
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In each regression reported in Table 8 , the coefficients of IB revenue % and commission revenue % are insignificantly different from zero. These results favor the rational discounting hypothesis, at least for the marginal investor. The performance of both groups of recommendation upgrades is negatively related to company size; the 30 http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html (accessed in November 2004). 31 The results are qualitatively similar when we include these observations. performance of one group of downgrades is positively related to the dummy variable for WSJ All Star analysts. None of the other variables is statistically significant.
Bubble vs. post-bubble periods
We next exploit the fact that our sample spans both the late 1990s U.S. stock bubble and a post-bubble period. During the bubble period, IPO and merger activities and stock prices were near record highs, and media attention was focused on analysts'
pronouncements. We therefore examine whether analyst behavior and investor response to analyst recommendations differed during the bubble and post-bubble periods. Given the euphoria on Wall Street and among investors during the bubble, analysts appear to have been under acute pressure to generate investment banking fees and brokerage commissions. As for the response of investors, the rational discounting hypothesis predicts greater discounting of analyst opinions during this period in response to heightened conflicts, while the naïve investor hypothesis predicts lower discounting.
We estimate regressions similar to those in Table 2 for relative recommendation levels, Table 4 for announcement abnormal returns, Table 6 for announcement abnormal volume, and Table 8 Table 9 . To save space, we only report the coefficient estimates for IB revenue % and commission revenue %.
Panel A of Table 9 shows that analysts appear to have inflated their recommendations in response to investment banking conflicts during both the bubble and post-bubble periods. But the magnitude of this effect is substantially greater during the bubble period than post-bubble. This difference is statistically significant. The magnitude of the effect is smaller for brokerage conflicts than for IB conflicts during both periods.
In fact, the effect for brokerage conflicts is negative during the bubble; it is positive and significantly higher post-bubble.
Panel B shows that in regressions of three-day abnormal returns, the coefficients of both IB revenue % and commission revenue % are significantly negative during the bubble period for both groups of upgrades. For the added to strong buy group, the coefficient of IB revenue % is significantly lower during the bubble period than postbubble. For downgrades, the coefficients of both variables are generally negative in both periods, and significantly lower post-bubble.
In regressions of three-day abnormal volume, the coefficients of IB revenue % and commission revenue % are negative for upgrades and positive for downgrades in all cases, both during and after the bubble. These coefficients are insignificantly different between the bubble versus post-bubble periods for both groups of upgrades and one group of downgrade. For the dropped from strong buy group, the coefficient of IB revenue % is significantly larger during the bubble period than post-bubble, but the coefficient of commission revenue % is significantly smaller. In regressions of 12-month stock performance, the coefficients of both variables are insignificant both during and after the bubble in nearly all cases, consistent with the results in Table 8 for the full sample period.
Overall, analysts appear to respond to investment banking conflicts both during and after the bubble, but the magnitude of their response has gone down post-bubble.
Perversely, while analysts do not seem to respond to brokerage conflicts during the bubble, they appear to do so after the bubble. Perhaps the intense regulatory and media focus on investment banking conflicts has led analysts to look for alternate avenues. Did investors discount conflicted analysts' opinions more during the bubble than in the postbubble period? The answer to this question is mixed. However, our evidence does not support the notion that investors threw caution to the wind during the bubble.
Summary and conclusions
Following the collapse of the late-1990s U.S. stock market bubble, there has been a widespread hue and cry from investors and regulators over the conflicts of interest faced by Wall Street stock analysts. The discovery of e-mails, in which analysts were privately disparaging stocks that they were touting publicly, led to the landmark $ The settlement basically presumes that analysts respond to the conflicts by inflating their stock recommendations, and that investors take analyst recommendations at face value.
Consistent with the view of the media and regulators, we find that optimism in stock recommendations is positively related to the importance of both IB and brokerage businesses to an analyst's employer. This pattern is more pronounced during the late 1990s stock market bubble with respect to IB conflict. However, we provide several pieces of empirical evidence that suggest that investors are sophisticated enough to adjust for this bias. First, the short-term reactions of both stock prices and trading volumes to recommendation upgrades vary negatively with the magnitude of potential IB or brokerage conflict faced by analysts. For instance, over the three days surrounding upgrades to strong buy, a one standard deviation increase in the proportion of revenue from investment banking is associated with a 0.31 percentage point decrease in abnormal returns and a 0.12 percentage point decrease in abnormal volume. These results suggest that investors ascribe lower credibility to an analyst's upgrade when the analyst is subject to greater pressures to issue an optimistic view. For downgrades, conflict severity varies negatively with the short-term stock price reaction and positively with the short-term trading volume impact. This pattern is consistent with the idea that investors perceive an analyst to be more credible if he is willing to voice an unfavorable opinion on a stock despite greater pressures to be optimistic.
Second, we find no evidence that the one-year investment performance of recommendation revisions is related to the magnitude of analyst conflicts, either for upgrades or for downgrades. This finding suggests that on average, investors properly discount analyst opinions for potential conflicts at the time the opinion is issued. Finally, investors discounted conflicted analysts' opinions during the late 1990s stock bubble, even in the face of the prevailing market euphoria. This evidence does not support the popular view that recommendations of sell-side analysts led investors to throw caution to the wind during the bubble period.
Overall, our empirical findings suggest that while analysts do respond to investment banking and brokerage conflicts by inflating their stock recommendations, the market discounts these recommendations taking analysts' conflicts into account. These findings are reminiscent of the story of the nail soup in Brealey and Myers (1991) , except that here, analysts (rather than accountants) are the ones who put the nail in the soup and investors (rather than analysts) are the ones to take it out. Our finding that the market is not fooled by biases stemming from conflicts of interest echoes similar findings in the literature on conflicts of interest in universal banking (e.g., Kroszner and Rajan (1994, 1997) and Gompers and Lerner (1999) ) and on bias in financial media (e.g., Bhattacharya, et al. (2007) and Reuter and Zitzewitz (2006)). Finally, while we cannot rule out the possibility that some investors may have been naïve, our findings do not support the notion that the marginal investor was systematically misled over the last decade by analyst recommendations.
The purpose of this Appendix is to describe the characteristics of disclosing and non-disclosing private securities firms, shed some light on their decisions to publicly disclose the income statement, and examine whether the resulting selection bias affects our main results in Table 2 . Table A1 provides summary statistics of recommendation levels and characteristics of disclosing and non-disclosing private securities firms.
Disclosing firms tend to be smaller and more liquid, and issue somewhat more optimistic stock recommendations than non-disclosing firms. The mean recommendation level for disclosing (non-disclosing) firms is about 3.9 (3.8). Their median total assets are about $4.0 million ($28.4 million) and the median ratio of cash and equivalents to total assets is about 0.10 (0.05). All these differences are statistically significant. The two groups of firms have similar financial leverage ratios and two-year growth rates in total assets.
We next examine cross-sectional determinants of a private securities firm's decision to disclose its income statement. In an excellent review of the corporate disclosure literature, Healy and Palepu (2001) point out that a firm is more willing to voluntarily disclose financial information when it needs to raise external financing, and when it is less concerned that the disclosure would damage its competitive position in product markets. Ceteris paribus, firms with greater growth opportunities, higher financial leverage, and less liquid resources are more likely to need external financing. So they are more likely to be open with potential investors by disclosing financial information, including the income statement. Similarly, smaller firms are likely to have greater need for external financing as they try to grow. In addition, given the intense competition in the securities business, smaller private firms are also likely to be more willing to disclose their profits and profitability because they have less business at stake.
For both reasons, smaller firms are likely to be more willing to disclose financial information. We control for firm size by the natural logarithm of one plus total assets in millions of dollars; growth opportunities by the two-year growth rate of total assets; financial leverage by the ratio of long-term debt to total assets; and liquidity by the ratio of cash and equivalents to total assets. We estimate a probit regression of discloser, which equals one for a disclosing firm, and zero otherwise.
Consistent with the predictions of corporate disclosure theory, the coefficients on firm size and liquidity are negative, and the coefficient on growth is positive. Contrary to the prediction, the coefficient on leverage is negative. All of these coefficients are highly statistically significant. The pseudo-R 2 of this model is 0.08. These results are not reported in a table to save space.
Finally, we examine whether the selection bias caused by a private securities firm's disclosure choice (and consequently the availability of data on IB revenue % and commission revenue %) affects our main results in Table 2 . While there is no Heckman selectivity correction for the ordered probit model, there is one for the regular probit model. So we define a binary variable to measure an optimistic recommendation that equals one, if an analyst's recommendation level on a stock exceeds the consensus level;
it equals zero otherwise. We then replace the dependent variable in the regression in section 4 above by this optimistic recommendation dummy. We estimate the resulting equation for the sub-sample of private securities firms two ways: (a) a regular probit model, and (b) a Heckman selectivity-corrected probit model, using the equation described in the second paragraph of this Appendix as the selection equation. Using approach (b) above, the coefficient of the selection term (i.e., the inverse Mills ratio) is statistically significant in the second-stage probit regression. More important for our purposes, the sign, magnitude and statistical significance of our main explanatory variables, IB revenue % and commission revenue %, are similar between the regular probit and the Heckman-corrected probit regression. These results do not support the idea that our main results in Table 2 are driven by the selection bias caused by a private securities firm's decision to disclose its revenue breakdown. To save space, these results
are not reported in a table. 
Table 2 Ordered Probit Analysis of Recommendation Levels Net of the Consensus
The table shows the results of ordered probit regressions explaining individual analysts' stock recommendation levels net of the consensus (i.e., median) recommendation level at the end of each quarter (March, June, September, December) from 1995 through 2003. Observations are excluded if the analyst issued no new or revised recommendation in the past 12 months. The regression includes observations pooled across analysts, stocks, and quarters. Investment banking (Brokerage commission) revenue % is the percentage of the brokerage firm's total revenues derived from investment banking (brokerage commissions). Large brokerage house dummy is an indicator variable that equals one if a brokerage house is in the top quartile of all houses, based on the number of analysts issuing stock recommendations on I/B/E/S in a given calendar year. Institutional Investor All-American (Wall Street Journal All-Star) analyst dummy is an indicator variable that equals one if the recommending analyst was listed as an All-American (All-Star) Team member in the most recent Institutional Investor (Wall Street Journal) analyst ranking. Company-specific research experience is the natural log of (1 + the number of days that an analyst has been issuing I/B/E/S research on a company). Number of companies followed equals the natural log of (1 + the number of companies followed by an analyst in the current calendar year). Company size is the natural logarithm of a followed company's market capitalization, measured twelve months prior to the end of the current month. The regression includes dummy variables for 2-digit I/B/E/S S/I/G industries and for calendar-quarters. Test statistics are based on a robust variance estimator. Each column in the table shows the results of a cross-sectional OLS regression explaining cumulative abnormal stock returns over days (-1, +1) surrounding one type of recommendation revision, as defined in Table 3 . Day 0 is the revision date. Investment banking (brokerage commission) revenue % is the percentage of a brokerage firm's total revenues derived from investment banking (brokerage commissions). Large brokerage house dummy is an indicator variable equal to one if a brokerage house is in the top quartile of all houses, based on the number of analysts issuing I/B/E/S stock recommendations in a given calendar year. Company size is the natural logarithm of a followed company's market capitalization, measured 12 months prior to the end of a given month. Institutional Investor All-American (Wall Street Journal All-Star) analyst dummy is an indicator variable equal to one if the recommending analyst was listed as an All-American (All-Star) in the most recent Institutional Investor (Wall Street Journal) annual analyst survey. Company-specific research experience is the natural log of (1 + the number of days that an analyst has been issuing I/B/E/S research on a company). Number of companies followed equals the natural log of (1 + the number of companies followed by an analyst in the current calendar year). T-statistics based on a robust variance estimator are reported in parentheses below coefficient estimates. All regressions include calendaryear and 2-digit I/B/E/S S/I/G industry dummies (not reported). Table 6 Cross-sectional Regressions of Abnormal Volume Surrounding Recommendation Revisions
Each column in the table shows the results of a cross-sectional OLS regression explaining cumulative abnormal share volume over days (-1, +1) surrounding one type of recommendation revision, as defined in Table 3 . Day 0 is the revision date. Share volume is normalized by dividing by the number of shares outstanding. Investment banking (brokerage commission) revenue % is the percentage of a brokerage firm's total revenues derived from investment banking (brokerage commissions). Large brokerage house dummy is an indicator variable equal to one if a brokerage house is in the top quartile of all houses, based on the number of analysts issuing I/B/E/S stock recommendations in a given calendar year. Company size is the natural logarithm of a followed company's market capitalization, measured 12 months prior to the end of a given month. Institutional Investor All-American (Wall Street Journal All-Star) analyst dummy is an indicator variable equal to one if the recommending analyst was listed as an All-American (All-Star) in the most recent Institutional Investor (Wall Street Journal) annual analyst survey. Company-specific research experience is the natural log of (1 + the number of days that an analyst has been issuing I/B/E/S research on a company). Number of companies followed equals the natural log of (1 + the number of companies followed by an analyst in the current calendar year). All regressions include calendar-year and I/B/E/S 2-digit industry dummies (not reported). T-statistics based on a robust variance estimator are reported in parentheses below coefficient estimates. Table 7 Medium-Term Investment Performance of Revisions in Analyst Stock Recommendations
The table shows average monthly abnormal returns to portfolios formed on the basis of analyst recommendation revisions. Abnormal returns are reported for three event windows relative to the month of revision (month 0), and are computed using an approach similar to Barber, Lehavy and Trueman (2006) . The abnormal return is the estimated intercept from a time-series regression of monthly portfolio returns using the Fama and French (1993) Table 8 Cross
-Sectional Regressions of Medium-Term Performance of Recommendation Revisions
Each column in the table shows the results of a cross-sectional OLS regression of average monthly abnormal returns over months (+1, +12) following one type of recommendation revision, as defined in Table 3 . Month 0 is the month of revision. Abnormal returns are estimated as the intercept from timeseries regressions of monthly stock returns on Fama and French (1993) factors for each firm. Investment banking (brokerage commission) revenue % is the percentage of a brokerage firm's total revenues derived from investment banking (brokerage commissions). Large brokerage house dummy is an indicator variable equal to one if a brokerage house is in the top quartile of all houses, based on the number of analysts issuing I/B/E/S stock recommendations in a given calendar year. Company size is the natural logarithm of a followed company's market capitalization, measured 12 months prior to the end of a given month. Institutional Investor All-American (Wall Street Journal All-Star) analyst dummy is an indicator variable equal to one if the recommending analyst was listed as an All-American (All-Star) in the most recent Institutional Investor (Wall Street Journal) annual analyst survey. Company-specific research experience is the natural log of (1 + the number of days that an analyst has been issuing I/B/E/S research on a company). Number of companies followed equals the natural log of (1 + the number of companies followed by an analyst in the current calendar year). T-statistics based on a robust variance estimator are reported in parentheses below coefficient estimates. Regressions include calendar year and I/B/E/S 2-digit S/I/G industry code dummies (not reported).
Explanatory Variable Denote statistical significance at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively, in two-tailed tests. Panel A shows the results of an ordered probit regression of recommendation levels net of the consensus (i.e., median) recommendation level on the explanatory variables in Table 2 , except that (1) Investment banking revenue % and Brokerage commission revenue % are interacted with dummy variables for the bubble or post-bubble period, and (2) calendar-quarter dummies are replaced with a post-regulation indicator (equal to 1 for quarters after May 2002). Panel B shows the corresponding results for ordinary-least-squares regressions explaining abnormal announcement stock returns, abnormal announcement volume, and abnormal oneyear performance of recommendation revisions by the explanatory variables used in Tables 4, 6 , and 8, modified as in (1) 
